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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores the influence of trader (or cambio) market power in determining the 
foreign exchange market bid-ask spread. In particular, it presents a theoretical model 
that incorporates the notion of oligopolistic power into the foreign exchange market. The 
econometric analysis substantiates the existence of oligopolistic trader market power in 
determining the spread.  Moreover, the results confirm the prediction of standard market 
microstructure theory that volatility exerts a positive effect on spread. We also uncovered 
a positive relationship between liquidity (the quantity of foreign exchange traded) and 
spread, a result which differs from the existing literature.  We interpret this finding to 
mean that oligopolistic traders set the mark-up exchange rate above where the purely 
competitive rate would have been so as to generate a surplus of US$ that is then hoarded.  
The econometric exercise utilizes a unique data set of trading volumes and buying/selling 
exchange rates for each cambio from January 2000 to December 2007.     
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper investigates the determinants of the persistent bid-ask spread in the 
Guyanese foreign exchange market.  The large literature that focuses on bid-ask spread 
concentrates on either equity markets or foreign exchange markets in the advanced 
developed economies and the large developing and emerging economies.  We present 
evidence for a small open underdeveloped economy, Guyana, which has undergone 
significant reforms in its foreign exchange (hereafter FX) regime since 1990. 
 
The theoretical literature suggests a positive relationship between bid-ask spread 
and volatility (or uncertainty). This positive relationship is formalized in a model 
 1
developed by Bollerslev and Melvin (1994).  There has been much empirical verification 
of the positive association between spread and volatility.  For instance, Boothe (1988) – 
who presented a seven country comparison – found exchange rate uncertainty as a main 
determinant of spread.  Glassman (1987) found exchange rate risk – modelled as the 
lagged absolute change in the exchange rate – to be a key determinant.  She also found 
that volume was positively related to bid-ask spread, albeit statistically insignificant in 
some regressions.   
   
An important paper by Melvin and Tan (1996) qualifies uncertainty as political 
and social unrest such as riots, demonstrations, strikes and armed attacks.  These two 
authors conclude that FX market spread is positively related to the country risk factors for 
South Africa.  Melvin and Tan also presented cross-sectional evidence for thirty-six 
countries.  Becker and Sy (2006) examined FX market bid-ask spreads during the Asian 
crisis; their results suggest that exchange rate risk – owing to the rapid depreciation of the 
Asian currencies – played an important role.  
     
Another theoretical issue pertains to the relationship between trading volumes and 
volatility.  The mixture distribution hypothesis1holds there is a strong positive correlation 
between volatility and unexpected trading volumes.  Market microstructure theory2 
implies that inventory costs associated with volume holding position increases as 
uncertainty rises.  Becker and Sy (2006) found that expected volume has a negative effect 
on spread for four countries out of the eight Asian countries they examined.  On the other 
hand, unexpected volume was found to be positive in six countries.  However, their 
strongest result is the positive association between the conditional variance and spread. 
     
This paper introduces the notion of market power in determining the spread and 
therefore ultimately the nominal exchange rate.  Dealer market power would be important 
in economies with nascent flexible exchange rate regimes.  Especially those 
underdeveloped economies that have implemented since the late 1980s market-based 
reforms in the financial sector in general and the FX market in particular3.  In this paper, 
we model the FX dealer as a Cournot oligopoly.  The dealer (cambio) sets the buying rate 
(bid rate) to obtain a percentage of the finite stock of hard currencies that the economy 
earns from exports, remittances, foreign aid and so on.  The selling rate (ask rate) is a 
mark-up over the buying rate and the marginal cost of doing business.  The dealer then 
either sells the mobilized FX or hoards a percentage.  The dealer earns the selling rate 
when he or she sells or earns the selling rate plus the rate of depreciation of the Guyana 
dollar vis-à-vis the primary trading currency (the US dollar) when FX is hoarded.  
    
                                                 
1 See Galati (2000) and Mende (2006) for a survey of the literature relating to this hypothesis.  
  
2 Sarno and Taylor (2001) present a comprehensive review of the market microstructure literature.  They 
delineate the methodology from macro-based theories of the foreign exchange market.  Instead of utilizing 
money demand functions, purchasing power parity theory, interest rate parity theory, and other macro 
constructs, the microstructure approach analyzes the trading activities of individual participants.   
   
3 See Galbis (1993) for an examination of foreign exchange market reforms in other developing countries. 
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We argue the representative dealer sets the mark-up exchange rate above what 
would have been the purely competitive rate.  The purpose for doing that is to mobilize 
an excess supply of FX in order to facilitate investments in foreign assets and even 
partake in conspicuous consumption.  However, it should be noted that the nominal 
mark-up exchange rate is not a fixed rate; rather it is flexible above the purely 
competitive rate (see figure 4). 
   
The empirical results suggest that spread: (i) is positively related to volatility; (ii) 
positively related to transaction volume; and (iii) positively related to a measure of 
market power.  Unlike many studies we were fortunate to have access to a unique dataset 
that comprise of trading volume and the exchange rates for each cambio that operated 
during January 2000 to December 2007.  The paper is structured as follows.  Section II 
outlines the institutional features of the Guyanese FX market.  Section III presents the 
oligopolistic model of the FX trader or cambio.  Section IV outlines the econometric 
methodology. Section V explains our empirical results, while section VI concludes.   
  
II. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF THE GUYANA FX MARKET 
 
The nominal rates of exchange between the Guyanese currency (the Guyana 
dollar: G$) and foreign currencies is determined in the local foreign exchange market (or 
the cambio market).  This market – and by extension the exchange rate regime – was 
reformed in 1990 when the parallel exchange rate was merged with the official rate.  The 
current exchange rate regime must be seen within the context of general macroeconomic 
and financial sector reforms and liberalization since the late 1980s.  For an early 
chronicle of the main foreign exchange reforms see Thomas and Rampersaud (1991), 
who noted that the nascent market was susceptible to trader pricing power.   Das and 
Ganga (1997) and Egoume-Bossogo et al (2003) situate the reforms – and so too Thomas 
and Rampersaud – as part of a larger financial liberalization exercise which included 
interest rate deregulation, the dismantling of directed credit facilities, bank privatization, 
indirect monetary policy, and various legal innovations to promote financial sector 
development.  Many other developing countries have followed a similar reform path for 
their FX market and regime (see Galbis 1993).    
 
The cambio market was established in March 1990.  The purpose was to integrate 
official rate with the parallel or street rate.  The official exchange rate was devalued 
several times to converge to the parallel rate.  The cambio market system, therefore, 
effectively dismantled the government mandated fixed exchange rate regime.  The 
dealers or cambios – which are given the right to trade by the Bank of Guyana buy and 
sell the stock of primary foreign currencies; namely the US dollars, but there are also 
small quantities of Canadian dollars, Euros and the British Pound.  As at the end of 2007 
the US dollar accounted for 89.8% of total volume trade; while the British Pound 
accounted for 3.8% thereby representing the second largest volume currency4.  Figure 1 
shows the stock of purchases and sales of FX in the local market since there is no 
                                                 
 
4 These percentages are based on data reported by the Bank of Guyana (Mar 2008) Statistical Bulletin.   
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offshore trading of the Guyana dollar (G$).  Analysts who collect the trading data believe 
that the stock reported to the central bank does not represent all hard currencies that pass 
through the economy.  This is because most of the traders are based in the capital city, 
Georgetown.    
The dealers purchase the stock of foreign exchange that is available; and in doing 
so they establish the buying rate.  The source of foreign exchange comes mainly from 
export earnings, tourism, remittances, foreign aid, central bank sales and underground 
economic activities.  Therefore, the cambios do not control the stock of FX, but rather the 
buying rate at which they hope to lure hard currencies.  The finite stock of FX, in the 
long-term, is largely dependent on the economic fortunes of the country and therefore it 
is exogenous to the cambio system.         
 
Figure 1: Trading volumes, 1999-2007 (US$) 
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The dealers then sell or hoard the purchased or mobilized quantity of FX.  They 
earn the selling rate if the quantity is sold to the central bank (which has a desire to 
accumulate international reserves) or sold to potential importers or those who wish to 
remit hard currencies abroad for various reasons.  If foreign currencies are hoarded they 
also earn the selling rate and the foreign interest rate5. 
   
The difference between the cambios’ buying and selling rates gives the spread, 
which is presented by figure 2 for both commercial bank and non-bank traders.  It is clear 
the commercial banks have the persistently higher spread.  The six commercial banks 
account for 90% for all trading activities; while the other 10% of FX volume is divided 
among the other fifteen non-bank participants.  Figure 3 presents the average market 
share of commercial bank versus non-bank dealers.  This observation, moreover, is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the spread reflects the role of market power.             
                                                 
5 Khemraj (2008a) found that the level of non-remunerated excess bank liquidity and foreign assets are 
highly correlated with the level foreign exchange available in the FX market.  For instance, when there is a 
deficit of foreign currencies commercial banks inadvertently accumulate excess liquidity and reduce 
foreign assets.  The opposite occurs when there is a surplus.     
 4
  As at the end of 2007 there were twenty-one cambios – fifteen non-bank cambios 
and six commercial banks.  There are substantial barriers to entry, both legal and 
institutional.  Moreover, the country’s capacity to earn foreign currencies provides a  
Figure 2: Average spreads of bank and non-bank cambios (G$), 2000-2007 
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Figure 3: Average market share of bank and non-bank traders (%), 2000-2007 
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natural entry barrier for many dealers.  As noted earlier there is a finite stock of FX that 
allows for the existence of a limited number of profitable participants.  The FX market is 
dominated by three of the six largest commercial banks.  There are natural entry barriers 
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inhibiting the entry of new private profit-maximizing commercial banks even though the 
sector has been liberalized.  Hence, the number of participants in the FX market is also 
limited.  This implies the FX market – and the commercial banking sector in general – is 
not very contestable; meaning the price does not have to be squeezed to marginal cost as 
a way to keep out potential entrants.                 
 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Finance theory suggests three primary determinants of bid-ask spreads whether in 
equity or FX markets.  These are cost of dealer services, cost of adverse selection and 
cost of holding inventory (see Sarno and Taylor 2001).   We hope to introduce the idea of 
market power into the mechanism of foreign exchange bid-ask spread.  Therefore, the 
selling rate is assumed to be a mark-up over the buying rate and the marginal cost of 
doing business.            
 
The FX dealer must optimize profits within the institutional context that was 
described in section II.  First, there is a scarce and finite stock of foreign currencies ( BX ) 
available to the cambios at any moment.  This finite stock of BX is determined by the 
economy’s long-term capacity to earn hard currencies.  The representative cambio sets 
the buying rate ( ) to mobilize a percentage of this finite stock – which is beyond the 
control of any individual cambio – in order to maximize profits.  The public must then 
accept the buying rate.       
Be
 
Second, the cambio allocates the mobilized BX  into two uses.  (i) It sells to those 
who wish to participate in importation or to the central bank which wants to accumulate 
foreign currency reserves.  When it sells the cambio earns the selling rate ( ).  The 
nominal selling and buying rates are quoted as G$/US$.  The quantity that is sold to the 
public is represented by
Se
SX .  (ii)  It hoards a percentage of the foreign currencies.  The 
quantity of hoarding is denoted by H.  Hoarding gives an expected rate of return of 
; where ( ) (S F D Se r p e     )Fr pA 0Se   signals a depreciation (with probability of 
depreciation = Dp ) and  signals an appreciation (with probability of appreciation 
= 
0Se
Ap ); and . 1D Ap p 
  
We model the representative dealer as a Cournot oligopoly.  An analogous 
oligopoly model of the banking firm is presented by Khemraj (2008b).  Equation 1 is the 
representative ith cambio’s profit function that is concave in ( , , )S BX X H . 
 
( ) ( ) [( ) ( ) ] ( , , )i s s si B B Bi S F D S F A i i S Be X X e X X e r p e r p H C X X H               (1) 
 
The dealer faces the following constraint Bi si iX X H  , which says the mobilized (or 
purchased) foreign currencies ( BiX ) can be sold ( siX ) to the public or hoarded ( ).  By 
substituting the constraint into equation 1, we obtain the profit function (equation 2) from 
which the first-order conditions are derived. 
iH
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( ) ( ) [ ] [( ) ( ) ] ( , , )i s s si B B S S F D S F A i i S Be X X e X X H e r p e r p H C X X H                 
          (2) 
; ;S Si Sj B Bi Bj i
i j i j i j
jX X X X X X H H
 
       H


)
   (2a) 
 
In a Cournot equilibrium the ith cambio maximizes profit – given by equation 1 – 
by taking the trading volumes and hoarding quantities of other cambios as given.  In other 
words, the ith cambio maximizes equation 2 to obtain the equilibrium quantities 
* *( ,Si iX H .  The condition 2a denotes the aggregate quantities available to the system. 
 
The cost function, , encapsulates the transaction and other costs 
associated with doing business.  In an economy such as Guyana’s labour cost, the cost of 
security (in light of high crimes), cost of electricity (which is one of the highest in the 
Caribbean and Latin America) and similar factors are likely to drive the traders’ cost of 
production and therefore the exchange rate spread. 
( , , )i S BC X X H
     
The mark-up selling rate 
 
Assume there is a unique equilibrium * * /SX X N
(S S Se X e
 where N = the number of 
cambios.  The cambio faces a downward sloping demand curve (in light of the notion of 
market power) with elasticity of demand of ) /S X S  
S
.  The inverse slope 
condition is given as .  Hence, we can now obtain the first condition 
by differentiating the profit function with respect to 
( ) 1/ ( )S S S Se X X e  
X .  Substitute into the derivative 
the demand elasticity and the inverse slope.  This gives equation 3, which says the selling 
rate is a mark up over the buying rate plus the marginal cost of doing business.  
    
1(1 ) ( ) 0i S B i
S S
d e e C X
dX N
     S         (3) 
 
The extent of the mark-up is dependent on 1/ SN .  The mark-up diminishes as 
 while it is highest when N  1N  .  We argue it is the non contestability of the 
market which makes this a possibility.  Equation 3 gives us an oligopolistically 
determined selling rate that is above the purely competitive equilibrium exchange rate.  
This oligopolistic rate is given by the first-order condition above.   
 
We can call the oligopolistic exchange rate a minimum rate ( ), which the 
powerful trader sets above the pure rate .  The pure rate clears the market at which 
point .    = the society’s demand curve for the economy’s finite stock of FX; 
while = the economy’s supply curve of the finite stock of FX.   is set above  
because the dealer (s) with market power would like to mobilize as much as possible the 
finite FX; the higher the mobilization the greater the possibility to hoard.  At the purely 
min
Se
n
*
Se
X XD S
XS
XD
mi
Se
*
Se
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competitive rate marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue [ ]; while the 
minimum exchange rate is given by 
* (S B Se e C X  )
min 1[ ( )] / (1S B i S
S
e e C X
N
)  
min
Se
. 
 
Figure 4 summarizes the basic ideas.   is not a fixed rate but rather a flexible 
rate that can fluctuate above the pure exchange rate.  However, the trader is more likely 
to depreciate the rate rather than appreciate it.  This rate allows the dealers to mobilize 
0 0X X  amount of the stock of FX.  This is amount that is hoarded in the post-
liberalization environment.   
 
 
Figure 4: A model of the FX market  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nominal Ex. Rate 
Quantity of FX 
SX DX 
X X
A 
B 
0 
C
*
Se
min
Se
 
 
Hoarding does not only occur in a liberalized setting, however.  It also occurs 
when government induces a fixed rate on the economy6. Assume this rate was set below 
the pure rate at, say, point A in figure 4.  That creates a blackmarket rate (parallel 
exchange rate at B).  At the parallel rate, B, there is also hoarding of the same amount 
0 0X X  . 
                                                
 What happens, basically, is hoarding is now legitimized by the reform 
agenda.  The laws and reforms of the society now take the conduit of hoarding from the 
parallel market to the licensed cambio market. 
 
We have noted above that the mark-up rate can change when there is an upward 
or downward shift in the flat line at .  But the minimum rate can also change when minSe
 
 
6 In the Guyanese context this would be the pre-1990 era.   
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demand and supply shocks cause the pure rate to overshoot .  Given the assumption 
that >  we would expect the oligopoly rate to once again adjust above .  For 
instance, a negative supply shock, ceteris paribus, which breaches the threshold point B 
will cause an upward adjustment in the minimum rate.  Similarly, a positive demand 
shock, ceteris paribus, which breaches threshold point C will also engender a similar 
upward adjustment.  In light of the assumption that bank and non-bank cambios set the 
mark-up rate above the competitive rate, the initial overshoot of the competitive rate over 
the mark-up rate will lead to an upward jump in the latter as traders again settle into a 
new threshold
min
Se
min
Se
*
Se
*
Se
7.  Central bank interventions could shift both the supply and demand 
curves.  Notice, however, the interventions are only effective after a certain threshold is 
superseded.  The supply curve can also shift owing to shocks to export earnings and 
remittances. 
    
The optimum level of hoarding 
  
Differentiating equation 2 with respect to H gives equation 4, which says the 
cambio chooses H at the point where the expected return equals the buying rate plus 
marginal cost of hoarding.  Moreover, we can obtain a general expression for the buying 
rate from equation 4.  
    
[(
, (iC
*
F  
                                        
) ( ) ] ( ) 0B S F D S F A i
d e e r p e r p C H
dH
       
]
Fr
        
i  
*[ ,B D r
*( )B F 
  (4) 
 
By rearranging equation 4 we can obtain a general expression for the buying rate 
)F Se p X        (5) 
Where:  (the return on holding foreign based assets); , 
and .    
Sr e 
0 [ (B ie C 
(B De p ) 0 
e r )] 0SX 
 
 
IV. ECONOMETRIC AND DATA ISSUES 
 
We follow an econometric procedure proposed by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 
(1980; 1979) in which the generalized least squares (GLS) estimator is obtained.  This 
methodology, which is used extensively in cross-sectional studies that examines stock 
returns, was adopted in this paper owing to the availability of granular data on the trade 
of foreign currency in Guyana. We were fortunate to have access to data on the purchase 
and sale of foreign currency based on individual market dealers.8  The methodology was 
 
7 The time series econometric identification of the supply and demand shocks and the inherent asymmetric 
effects on exchange rate (for various developing countries) is the subject of another paper.   
 
8 To the authors’ knowledge, all of the previous studies on the bid-ask spread of the foreign exchange 
market were based on aggregated data, i.e., data that captures the operation of the entire foreign exchange 
market. 
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also used my Datar et al (1998).  The outline given below is similar to that used by Datar 
et al.  However, we utilize the methodology for the foreign exchange market, while Datar 
et al examined stock returns.  Moreover, this econometric procedure is employed because 
the GLS estimator is usually more efficient than the ordinary least square (OLS) and 
generalized method of moment (GMM) estimators.9     
 
The econometric procedure proposed by Litzenberger and Ramsawamy can be 
divided into three stages.10 
 
Stage one: during this stage, the bid-ask spread is regressed on the liquidity 
conditions in the foreign exchange market, the volatility associated with the mobilization 
of foreign currency and the proxy for market power of each cambio. In particular, the 
regression model (equation 6) is estimated using cross-section methodology for each 
month in our sample period, i.e., January 2000 to December 200711.   
 
, 1 2 , 3 , 1 4 , 5 , 1 6 ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i tBAS LIQ LIQ VOL VOL MKP ,                (6)   
 
where BASi,t is the bid-ask spread of cambio i at time t; LIQi,t and LIQi,t-1 represent the 
liquidity of foreign exchange holdings of each cambio at time t ant t-1 respectively; 
MKPi,t is the relative market power of each cambio i at time t; VOLi,t and VOLi,t-1 
represent the volatility associated with mobilizing foreign currency by each cambio at 
time  t and t-1 respectively; and ,i t is the stochastic error term. 
 
The cross-sectional models are estimated using ordinary least squares. Given the 
nature of the estimation technique used at this stage, it is possible that the standard errors 
our models may be under/over-estimated due to the presence of extreme data. Therefore, 
White's heteroskedasticity-robust procedure is employed to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
This technique is particularly useful when the form of heteroskedasticity is unknown.12  
 
Stage two: the second stage of the exercise involves computing the weighted 
average coefficients (or GLS estimators) for the entire sample period based on equation 
(7) below.  
 
T
kt kt
t 1
ˆ   Wk ˆ 

         (7) 
                                                 
9 See for instance Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Davidson and 
MacKinnon (2004) and Greene (2003).   
   
10 See for instance Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Datar et al 
(1998). 
 
11Over the period of analysis there were twenty-four cambios in 2000 and 2001; twenty-three cambios in 
2002; and twenty-one cambios for the period 2003 to 2007. Out of the total number seven were commercial 
banks from 2000 to 2003, while six commercial bank cambios  existed from 2004 to 2007.            
 
12 See White (1980) and Wooldridge (2002) for a comprehensive discussion of the White’s estimator. 
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Where: 
 
 ˆk  weighted average of each of the estimated  (or the GLS estimators) for the 
entire sample period. 
 ˆkt
 ˆkt  the estimated betas for each month obtained from the first-step regression. 
Wkt = the weight of each beta defined according to:  
 
1
kt
1
1
ˆ[Var ( )]  
ˆ[ ( )]
kt T
ktt
W
Var





   
Where: 
 
1
kt )]ˆ([
Var  = the inverse of the variance obtained for the estimated betas for each time 
period. 
 Tt ktVar1 1)]ˆ([  = the sum of the inverse of the variance over the entire sample period 
 
The standard errors from the first-step regression are used to compute the variance 
associated with the estimated betas. 
 
The statistical significance of the estimated betas is determined using t-statistics 
computed as follows: 
 
 k
ˆ
  
ˆ
k
t ratio
Var


        (8)    
 
where:        )ˆ(  )ˆ( T
1t
2
ktktk VarWVar   
 
Stage three: the final stage of the exercise involves checking the robustness of our 
results. This is done by computing the GLS estimator for different time periods and 
testing the statistical significance of these estimators using the t-statistics above. 
Following Datar et al (1998) we divide our sample into two equal non-overlapping sub-
periods and compute the GLS estimator. The GLS estimator for each sub-period is then 
examined to determine whether they are stable over time. 
 
Data Issues 
 
The study utilizes a dataset which comprise of weekly data on the purchase and 
sale of US dollar (US$) by all the cambios that operated from January 2000 to December 
2007. In order to preclude survivorship bias, we did not exclude dead cambios from our 
sample.  Specifically, we take weekly data from the Bank of Guyana on the trade of US$ 
by each trader (cambio) to construct appropriate proxies to determine the impact of 
liquidity, risk and market power on the bid-ask spread. This unique dataset provides us 
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with the opportunity to employ the GLS estimation technique.  Using our dataset we 
construct the bid-ask spread (BASi,t) for each cambio i by subtracting the buying-rate (eB) 
from the selling-rate (eS) of the US$.  
 
The liquidity variable, LIQ, is defined as the ratio of foreign currency sold (XS) to 
the stock of foreign currency at hand (that is, the foreign currency purchased XB plus the 
amount which is hoarded H). It is important to note that this variable does not only 
capture the rate at which foreign currency is being disposed of after it is mobilized but it 
also reflects the mismatch between the demand for foreign currency and the amount 
available at each cambio at different time intervals. To the extent that the market dealers 
are desirous of disposing of foreign currency we would expect that in periods of high 
liquidity (i.e., when the amount of foreign currency available is relatively higher than the 
amount being demanded by investors) the spread should be set at a low level to 
encourage higher sales.  
 
However, if the market dealers are intent on hoarding foreign currency, we would 
expect the reverse to hold true, i.e., in periods of high liquidity the spread and by 
extension the US$ exchange rate will be higher to discourage investors from purchasing 
US$. In line with our reasoning, we expect the LIQ variable to exert a negative effect on 
the BAS if the intention of the market dealers is to use the mobilized foreign currency for 
the purpose of re-selling.  Where the intention of the market dealers is to hoard the 
mobilized foreign currency a positive relationship between the LIQ variable and BAS is 
expected. In our model the LIQ variable is introduced contemporaneously and with a lag 
of one month.  
 
We test the notion of market power, MKP, by creating a dummy that captures the 
market share of each dealer13.  In this study we make the explicit assumption that a 
bigger cambio possesses more power to increase the spread. To construct this dummy, we 
first identify the average market share of each cambio14. The average market share is then 
compared with the actual market share of each trader and a value of one is assigned if the 
latter is greater than the former. Otherwise a value of zero is assigned. Given the manner 
in which this variable is constructed it is important to note that it does not necessarily 
represent the absolute size of the market dealer but the relative size (or market shares) of 
each dealer for different time periods. Based on our proposition that the spread increases 
with market power, we expect a positive relationship between MKP and the BAS. 
 
To test the impact of risk we construct a variable which captures the volatility 
(VOL) associated with the mobilization of foreign currency (XB). Since there is little 
variation in the nominal buying and selling rates for the US$ we focus on the volatility 
                                                 
13 We used a dummy variable instead of the actual percentages to circumvent the problem of extreme 
values in the actual percentage shares.  
  
14 The other side of this argument is larger traders and banks earn economies of scale and therefore are able 
to offer lower spreads.  We have noted that the Guyanese financial system has significant entry barriers, 
thus price is not squeezed to marginal cost.     
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associated with the volume of foreign currency mobilized by the cambios15. In particular, 
we measure volatility by taking the standard deviation in the weekly sale of foreign 
currency (XS) of each cambio. This variable is introduced contemporaneously and with a 
lag of one month. Consistent with previous studies we expect a positive relationship 
between this risk proxy and the BAS at time t and t-1.    
 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the variables used in our regression 
model. These statistics were computed after pooling our dataset for the entire sample 
period (that is, from January 2000 – December 2007). Based on Table 1, the bank-
cambios are relatively larger and usually maintain higher spreads than their non-bank 
counterparts. This evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that size promotes greater 
market power and ability to maintain larger spread.  
 
The volatility associated with the foreign currency mobilized by the bank cambios 
is also higher than that of non-bank cambios suggesting that the former is exposed to 
more risk in mobilizing foreign currency when compared to the latter. However, the 
turnover rate of the non-bank cambios is higher than those of the bank cambios even 
though the latter undertake larger volumes of transactions. This probably suggests that 
non-bank cambios are more inclined at disposing foreign currency rather than hoarding 
same.  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics – January 2000 to December 2007 
 
BAS i,t MKP i,t VOL i,t LIQ i,t BAS i,t MKP i,t VOL i,t LIQ i,t
Mean 3.83 13.66 0.98 0.46 2.25 0.22 0.51 0.78
Median 3.76 13.64 0.85 0.44 2.21 0.23 0.47 0.80
Maximum 5.84 14.12 3.71 0.81 3.02 0.46 1.42 0.93
Minimum 2.65 12.98 0.30 0.15 1.58 0.06 0.21 0.42
Std. Dev 0.62 0.27 0.53 0.15 0.31 0.09 0.22 0.10
Descriptive 
Statistics
Commercial Bank Cambios Non-Bank Cambios
 
Where: 
BASi,t = the bid-ask spread of each cambio at time t. 
MKPi,t = the relative market share of each cambio at time t. 
VOLi,t = the volatility associated with the mobilization of foreign currency by each cambio at time t. 
LIQi,t = the turnover rate of foreign currency obtained each trader at time t. 
 
V. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
During the estimation stage, we estimated several cross-sectional regression 
models of the BAS on the MKP, LIQ and VOL individually and jointly. These models 
were estimated for each month of our sample period starting from January 2000 to 
December 2007. The coefficients of these models were then aggregated across time using 
equation 7 to obtain the GLS estimator, while the t-statistics were obtained by equation 8.   
                                                 
15 The measure of volatility was computed from trading volumes instead of the buying or selling rate 
because volume exhibited more variability.  Also as noted the exchange rate is a mark-up rate and thus it is 
not exogenous to the traders.  Volume we have noted is exogenous to the traders and dependent on the 
economy’s capacity to earn FX.    
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Table 2: Regression results 
 
This table shows the GLS estimates obtained by computing the average slopes of various monthly cross-
section regression models of BAS (bid-ask spread) on MKP (market power), LIQ (liquidity) and VOL (risk). 
The GLS estimators and associated t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed based on the methodology in 
section IV.  The monthly cross-section regression models are estimated with the dependent variables 
individually and jointly using the equation below and data for the entire sample period (from January 2000 
December 2007. 
Constant MKP LIQi,t LIQi,t-1 VOLi,t VOLi,t-1
Model 1 1.40 2.20
(9.62)* (7.83)*
Model 2 1.24 0.22
(6.02)* (2.25)**
Model 3 1.25 0.05
(5.97)* (1.77)***
Model 4 1.54 0.55
(10.22)* (5.71)*
Model 5 1.53 0.58
(10.38)* (5.17)*
Model 6 0.46 2.13 0.48
(3.48)* (7.53)* (3.39)*
Model 7 1.37 2.06 0.05
(9.43)* (6.08)* (0.62)
Model 8 0.86 0.22 0.49
(4.71)* (2.55)** (5.43)*
Model 9 0.45 2.13 0.20 0.05
(3.34)* (6.53)* (2.42)* (0.62)
Entire Sample
 
*, ** and *** imply statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the aggregated coefficients and accompanying 
t-statistics for the entire sample period. Based on the results, the LIQ variable is 
significantly and positively related to the BAS indicating that the market power of foreign 
exchange dealers is an important determinant of the BAS.  This evidence also provides 
support to our earlier observation that bank cambios (which are the large cambios) charge 
relatively higher spread than their non-bank counterparts (the small cambios). 
 
The results also suggest that LIQ has a strong positive contemporaneous 
relationship with the BAS, indicating that higher liquidity in the foreign exchange market 
leads to larger spreads.  While our evidence is inconsistent with the evidence in the 
existing literature it is consistent with our proposition that the market dealers are 
motivated by the desire to hoard foreign currency. In other words, our evidence is 
suggesting that whenever the demand for foreign currency is relatively high the market 
dealers are likely to increase the spread. This may have the effect of increasing the 
minimum selling rate above the purely competitive rate, consequently discouraging 
investors from purchasing the US$. Furthermore, the relationship between the turnover 
rate variable with a one month lag has a positive relationship with the BAS but is 
insignificant.  
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Table 3: Regression results (GLS estimates) 
 
Panel A contains the results of the dataset for the first sub-period from 2000 to 2003 while panel B shows 
the results for the second sub-period (i.e., from 2004 to 2007). 
Constant MKP LIQi,t LIQi,t-1 VOLi,t VOLi,t-1
Model 1 1.48 2.01
(7.29)* (5.64)*
Model 2 1.20 0.76
(4.08)* (2.43)**
Model 3 1.25 0.39
(4.15)* (2.32)**
Model 4 1.63 0.61
(7.82)* (4.18)*
Model 5 1.62 0.71
(7.78)* (4.15)*
Model 6 0.34 1.92 0.91
(1.99)** (5.35)* (3.40)*
Model 7 1.46 1.85 0.04
(7.03)* (3.97)* (0.33)
Model 8 0.85 0.68 0.50
(3.09)* (2.27)** (3.67)*
Model 9 0.44 2.02 0.99 0.03
(2.19)* (4.51)* (3.66)* (0.21)
Model 1 1.31 2.50
(6.30)* (5.50)*
Model 2 1.28 0.16
(4.43)* (2.30)**
Model 3 1.25 0.05
(4.29)* (1.64)***
Model 4 1.44 0.50
(6.60)* (3.93)*
Model 5 1.44 0.48
(6.90)* (3.23)*
Model 6 0.65 2.49 0.31
(3.07)* (5.40)* (2.54)**
Model 7 1.29 2.30 0.05
(6.31)* (4.66)* (0.53)
Model 8 0.87 0.18 0.48
(3.55)* (2.80)* (4.00)*
Model 9 0.66 2.27 0.39 0.07
(3.06)* (4.74)* (2.42)** (0.84)
Panel B: Sub-sample (2004 - 2007)
Panel A: Sub-sample (2000 - 2003)
 
*, ** and *** imply statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Furthermore, the results provide mixed evidence with respect to the relationship 
between the volatility in the level of transactions and the BAS. There is a significant 
positive contemporaneous relationship between volatility and BAS in models 4 and 8. 
This can be interpreted to mean that the spread is likely to be larger in periods where 
there is greater volatility in the level of transaction. We find that the volatility in the past 
period is also positively and significantly related to the BAS in model 5. This means that 
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BAS is influenced by the volatility in the level of transactions in the previous month. 
However, while the volatility variable is positive in model 6 and 9 it is insignificant. 
 
As a robustness check, we divide our sample into two equal non-overlapping 
periods and aggregate the coefficients using the methodology that was described.  Table 4 
provides the results from this exercise. The results are not significantly different from 
those we obtain from looking at the entire sample period. In particular, we find that the 
slope coefficient of LIQ remains positive and highly significant in both sub-periods. The 
BAS is also positively and significantly related to MKP.  The same can be said for the 
volatility in the level of transaction during the current and past periods. Also, the 
magnitudes of the slope coefficients are not significantly different between the two sub-
periods. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this paper we used the GLS methodology to ascertain the factors that determine 
the BAS of the G$/US$ exchange rate. We found that the spread is affected by the 
volatility in the level of transactions during the current and past period. In particular, the 
evidence suggests that higher volatility leads to higher spread.  We also uncovered a 
significant positive relationship between MKP (the proxy for market power) and the 
spread. This is an indication that there is segmentation in the foreign exchange market, 
whereby large cambios (the commercial banks) are able to set higher spreads and 
consequently dictate the nominal exchange rate.  
 
The level of liquidity in the market also affects the spread. Our evidence suggests 
that the BAS tends to be wider during periods when there are high levels of transaction (or 
liquidity) in the market. While this evidence is inconsistent with the existing literature in 
financial economics, it is consistent with our proposition that the market dealers are 
motivated by the desire to hoard foreign exchange.  The robustness testing, using 
different sub-periods, confirms that our results are consistent over time.  Our findings led 
us to propose a theoretical model of the foreign exchange market in which the 
oligopolistic mark-up rate is placed above the purely competitive rate.   
 
For future research we intend to identify the foreign exchange supply and demand 
shocks and then test to determine whether the shocks have asymmetric effects on 
exchange rate dynamics.  Such asymmetric effects would be consistent with the notion of 
a sticky oligopolistic exchange rate.   
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